Comparative scholars fundamentally disagree about the impact of partisan politics in modern welfare states, particularly in certain 'new' policy areas such as active labor market policy (ALMP).
Introduction
It has been widely established that the last 15-20 years have seen an 'activation turn' of labor market policy across the OECD. Responding to the generally high unemployment and inactivity rates of the 1980s and early 1990s, governments have introduced a mix of demanding and enabling so-called 'active labor market policy' (ALMP) schemes aimed at the unemployed and some groups outside of the labor force (e.g. housewives and single parents) to facilitate their entry into employment. Although evaluations find mixed evidence regarding the effects of ALMPs on employment (Card et al., 2010; Kluve, 2010; Martin, 2014) These developments have spurred a growing interest among comparative political scientists in the political and economic processes that determine the scale and orientation of ALMPs provided by governments across the EU and the OECD. Several books have been devoted to the policy area (e.g., Eichhorst et al., 2008; Weishaupt, 2011; Bonoli, 2013) , and it is placed at the center of attention in most recent volumes that investigate the overall development of modern welfare states (e.g., Morel et al., 2012; Bonoli and Natali, 2012; Hemerijck, 2013; Thelen, 2014) . Particular interest has been paid to the role of partisan politics for ALMP development; however, to date, scholars have not come anywhere close to a consensus regarding this matter. Over the past ten years, studies have alternately reported evidence supporting hypotheses about positive, nonexistent, and negative relationships between left-wing strength and the level of ALMP 'effort' exerted by the government.
This lack of scholarly agreement was recently noted by Clasen et al. (2016, p. 13) , who forcefully argued that most comparative research in the field has been fallen prey to conceptual underspecification of the dependent variable and that " [t] he process of uncovering the causal dynamics specific to this policy field is still in its infancy". They suggest that scholars who search for variables to explain variations in ALMP development might want to look beyond the "usual suspects", such as partisanship, and instead (or also) consider some rather different political institutional variables, for instance, those related to the nature of the national systems of public expenditure planning and control and the multi-actor delivery systems that characterize ALMPs.
variables are presented. The fourth section reports the results from a set of models, which lend support to both hypotheses. A fifth section concludes; Appendix I provides supplementary data; and Appendix II presents additional robustness checks and extensions.
Party politics and active labor market policy: a review
As previously noted by multiple scholars, the cumulative evidence from the studies conducted over the past ten years about the effect of partisan politics on ALMP 'effort' has been surprisingly inconclusive, especially given the similarity in the research questions and data applied (Bonoli, 2013; Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2013; Clasen et al., 2016) . Based on the results these studies report, most of them can be divided into three groups 1 .
Those in the first group have found that left-wing influence is positively related to ALMP 'effort' (Huo et al., 2008; Iversen and Stephens, 2008; van Vliet and Koster, 2011) . These results are consistent with the 'power resources' school's account of ALMP development, in which social democratic governments are considered more inclined to expand ALMP in order to strengthen labor as an organized social force by contributing to lower levels of unemployment. This understanding of ALMP was long the dominant one among welfare state scholars (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Janoski, 1990 Janoski, , 1994 Rothstein, 1996; Boix, 1998) .
A second group of studies have reported that the government's ideological underpinnings have no impact on ALMP 'effort' (Rueda, 2005; Franzese and Hays, 2006; Armingeon, 2007; Gaston and Rajaguru, 2008; Bonoli, 2013) . Multiple explanations have been proposed for why ideology is not expected to have an impact on such efforts. Mucciaroni (1990) , Swenson (2002) , and Farnsworth (2012 and Farnsworth ( , 2013 have argued that ALMPs-particularly training programs and labor market services-are often in the interest of workers and employers alike. As such, they are less likely to be a subject of partisan dispute. Another explanation is that policy diffusion-spurred by mutual learning experiences, a broad consensus among policy experts, and the influence of employment strategies adopted by the EU and the OECD-has caused party preferences for labor market policy to converge (Franzese and Hays, 2006; Armingeon, 2007; Lindvall, 2010; Nelson, 2013) . This "deep shift in thinking" (Nelson, 2013, p. 272 ) since around 1998 is sometimes referred to as the "activation turn" (Bonoli, 2010, p. 435 ).
Lastly, a few studies have found a negative relationship between left-wing influence and spending on (at least some categories of) ALMP. Drawing on insider-outsider theories of unemployment in economics, Rueda (2005 Rueda ( , 2006 Rueda ( , 2007 has made the influential claim that because unions and-for electoral reasons-social democratic parties tend to favor the interests of labor market insiders, they are unlikely to support, and might even oppose, ALMPs. According to this account, ALMPs do not favor insiders because they promote the employment entry of outsiders who can underbid insiders' wage demands, while at the same time they increase the tax burden (Rueda, 2005) . In accordance with this theory, Rueda (2007) found that increased left-wing strength resulted in a decreased ALMP spending. Building on Rueda's work, Tepe and Vanhuysse (2013) recently introduced the 'left party disinvestment thesis'. Supporting a weak version of that thesis, they found that increased left-wing influence does not typically increase overall ALMP expenditure; in addition, in line with a strong version of that thesis, they found that increased left-wing influence decreases spending on the one category of ALMPs-direct job creation programs-which they suggest will most likely benefit outsiders. Nelson (2013) and Vlandas (2013) , mark a new wave of ALMP research that does not fit nicely into any of the three previous bodies of research.
However, while they indeed represent a sophisticated advance within the field, the joint results from these studies on the effect of left-wing strength on ALMP 'effort' are as inconclusive as those in previous literature 3 . These inconclusive results party stem from the difficulties involved in deriving hypotheses about party preferences for particular categories of ALMP programs because, as aptly demonstrated by Clasen et al. (2016, p. 10) , programs that fall in the same administrative category may have "very distinctive aims and presumably very different political support coalitions".
The role of ALMP: to reduce unemployment or to expand labor supply?
In this paper, I argue that the differences in ALMP programs' objectives are key for understanding partisan differences in ALMP preferences. Possibly the first scholar to provide this insight was Furåker (1976) , who classified the traditional categories of labor market policy interventions based on whether they were meant to serve either one or both of two possible purposes: reducing (or preventing) unemployment and/or reducing (or preventing) labor shortages 4 . In Furåker's model, as in those of some other contemporary scholars (e.g. Hibb's (1977) ), sellers (i.e., workers) and buyers (i.e., employers) on the labor market vary in their preferences regarding unemployment.
Accordingly, he suggested that the ways in which governments prioritize labor market measures depend on the extent to which each group has been able to influence government policy. Thus, leftwing governments, which tend to favor workers' interests, are expected to prioritize measures that aim to reduce unemployment, whereas right-wing governments, which have closer ties to the business community, are expected to be more concerned about labor shortages.
Research from the past two decades has provided an additional reason for why left-wing governments might tend to be more concerned about unemployment: electoral motivations stemming from issue ownership. At the ballot box, left-wing governments are often found to be penalized particularly harshly for unemployment (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999; van der Brug et al., 2007) . Now, although I find Furåker's framework largely compelling, I contend that the most important determinant of whether a labor market program is meant to reduce unemployment or labor shortages is not the program's content but its targeting of people who are already participating in the labor market or those who are not. Indeed, contrary to Rueda's (2006, p. 388) influential claim that "ALMPs unambiguously benefit outsiders", I argue that whereas some categories of labor market programs-such as sheltered employment for the disabled-target people who are fairly homogeneous with respect to their 'outsiderness', most categories accommodate programs for which the primary target group includes those at the 'core' of the labor force and programs that target people who are on the fringes or even outside the labor market. For instance, Clasen et al. (2016, p. 10) show that the direct job creation category accommodates both types of programs. In addition, labor market training programs are known to accommodate many programs that target particularly disadvantaged groups 5 ; however, the education schemes and the accompanying work time reduction subsidies included in the so-called short-time work (STW) programs, which many European governments rolled out during the recent financial crisis, primarily targeted workers who were already employed but who ran the risk of becoming unemployed 6 (Hijzen and Venn, 2011) .
These examples illustrate why the attention that Furåker pays to program categories might be misguided, and they might also partly explain why the results from the most recent wave of ALMP research are so inconclusive.
To summarize, I propose shifting the focus away from program categories and argue that a program's overarching aim-unemployment reduction or labor force expansion-is more likely to be the primary source of partisan conflict. Two hypotheses can be derived to test this claim. First, I
expect that left-wing governments are more prone than right-wing governments to expand labor market programs that exclusively target people at the 'core' of the labor force who are unemployed or at risk of becoming unemployed. By contrast, in line with Boix's (1998, p.4) remark that "[i]n the first place, all parties prefer to develop policies that maximize growth", I expect less of a partisan effect for programs that also, or exclusively, target 'non-core' groups. 
Data and Operationalization

The EU Labor Market Policy database
The comparative research on ALMP has invariably used the OECD Labor Market Policy (LMP) database, which contains country-year observations on expenditures on a number of program categories, starting in 1985 for a subset of countries (Grubb and Puymoyen, 2008 Second, all data are reported via a questionnaire that is completed by national authorities, and approximately 10 percent of the reported quantitative data are based on estimations. Therefore, systematic cross-country differences in reporting and estimation practices might distort crosscountry data comparisons. However, in the present study, this problem is mitigated by the fact that all regression models include program-fixed effects, which ensure that no between-country variation is used to estimate the parameters.
Third, whereas the data are based in principle, on a full count of labor market programs as defined by Eurostat (2013) , the database is only supposed to cover interventions at the national and regional levels. As argued by Clasen et al. (2016) , the omission of local ALMPs might distort comparative
analyses, yet I argue that the present study is spared from such problems because the unit of analysis is an individual program, not a country-level aggregate. Finally, whereas most program categories in the database contain only labor market interventions that "aim to benefit identifiable individuals" (Eurostat, 2013, p. 7) and that are thus suitable for inclusion in this study, the labor market services category also covers functions that are not directly linked to individual participants, such as services for employers, administrative functions and general overhead. Therefore, this program category is excluded from the study, along with the two categories that are typically not considered 'active' labor market policies: out-of-work income maintenance and support and early retirement. Despite these issues, the data in the EU LMP database seem to be of high quality and satisfactorily comparable across interventions and years, particularly if only within-country or within-program variation is used in estimations.
Dependent variable: ALMP 'effort'
Most large-N comparative researchers base their indicators of governments' ALMP 'efforts' on how much public spending (relative to GDP) is devoted to the policy area. In an effort to disentangle the effects of deliberate policy decisions from the effects of economic conditions, many scholars control for the 'problem pressure' by adjusting the rate of unemployment on either side of the regression equation. However, as discussed by Clasen et al. (2016) , unemployment rates are "notoriously problematic in comparative analysis as they are expressed as a ratio of the labour force". Because unemployment, inactivity and employment are communicating vessels, expansion in policy areas such as early retirement, higher education, or part-time work that lead to a decline in unemployment rate might generate "a largely artificial image of increasing ALMP 'effort'". (Clasen et al., 2016, p. 7) . Moreover, as noted above, many ALMP programs mechanically alter the labor market status of their participants from unemployed to inactive or employed, which means that indicators of 'effort' that are adjusted according to unemployment may "be endogenously ratcheted upwards or downwards by increases or decreases in expenditure on measures that have a direct impact on the unemployment rate" (Clasen et al., 2016, p. 8) .
Another problem with routinely adjusting spending for the unemployment rate is that being unemployed does not necessarily imply that one takes part in the programs provided by the government. An analysis of an indicator reported by Eurostat (2015a) , which measures the share of the registered unemployed who participate in an ALMP program, reveals that the 'activation rate' varies considerably-between countries and within countries. For the 214 observed country-years, nested in 24 countries, the overall mean activation rate is 21.6 percent of the registered unemployed.
The between-country standard deviation is 11.4 percentage points, and the within-country standard deviation is 6.1 percentage points. This variation indicates that simply adjusting ALMP spending for unemployment does not get us very far if we want to reliably assess how the treatment that an unemployed individual can expect to receive from the government varies between countries or over time. The literature devoted to the traditional social insurance systems (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Scruggs and Allan, 2006 ) recognizes the coverage rates and eligibility criteria of these policies as important dimensions. Similarly, I argue that who and how many individuals participate in ALMP programs warrants further attention.
Whereas the problems discussed above should not necessarily lead us to dismiss ALMP spending altogether when conceptualizing ALMP 'effort', I argue that Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 20) was right to remark that if our aim as welfare state scholars "is to test causal theories that involve actors, we should begin with the demands that were actually promoted by those actors" and that "it is difficult to imagine that anyone struggled for expenditure per se". maintain that Scope is a better proxy than Expenditure for the extent to which a government seeks to intervene in the labor market in a discretionary manner to achieve some particular objective, which, fortunately, is of interest in the present study. Second, whereas the expenditure data in the EU LMP database are considered relatively complete, more gaps can be found in the participant data (European Commission, 2015) , which is another reason to use Expenditure as a robustness check.
Because the relationships between the programs' Scope (as well as Expenditure) and the independent variables of interest are not expected to be linear (for good reason), the dependent variable is log-transformed 8 .
Dependent variable: "ALMP effort"
The analyses include two program-level independent variables of particular interest: Core target group and Broken unemployment. Both are program-year dummy variables that are extracted from the qualitative data reports of the EU LMP database.
Core target group is assigned a 0 if the program is available for one or both of the two target groups . In practice, 'other registered jobseekers' "refers to persons who are unemployed (but do not qualify as registered unemployed), underemployed or inactive". While the definitions of these two target groups cover a rather heterogeneous set of individuals, none of these individuals is unemployed according to the national definition-nor employed and at risk of unemployment.
Therefore, programs that target-partly or exclusively-one of these two groups serve, at least to some extent, to increase labor force participation. Conversely, programs that only target 'registered unemployed' or 'employed at risk' primarily seek to reduce (or prevent) unemployment. I include program-fixed effects in all models to control for unobserved between-program heterogeneity, including any differences stemming from potential systematic cross-country differences in the way that participant and expenditure data are reported to the EU LMP database. I thereby also control for a number of largely time-invariant, country-level factors that have been found to affect ALMP 'effort' in previous studies, including welfare regime differences, trade openness, the degree of employer coordination and the involvement of social partners in The indicator of GDP is retrieved from Eurostat (2015b) ; data on unemployment and inactivity come from the EU Labor Force Survey (Eurostat, 2015c) ; and the other variables are provided by Armingeon et al. (2015) . I also control for the Number of programs that are operating in the country during a particular year because-all other things being equal-the more ALMP programs in place at the same time, the smaller each individual program is likely to be. Lastly, I add year dummies to control for possible common temporal shocks.
To assure full comparability between models with and without a lagged dependent variable, I also leave out the first observation of each panel in the models without a lagged dependent variable to attain an identical sample for both types of models. After excluding the few programs for which one or more interruptions exist in the time series, I end up with a main sample of approximately 5,600
program-years nested in nearly 900 programs, which are nested in 28 countries
11
. Descriptive statistics for all included variables are reported in Appendix I, Table 4 . Table 5 in Appendix I documents how the observations are distributed across countries and years, and Table 6 shows how the data are structured by presenting a detailed description of two observations from two different programs in different countries.
Estimation strategy and results
This section reports the results from a set of models that can all be represented-with various restrictions-with the same general equation: Because the program-fixed effects included in these models do not necessarily completely control for within-cluster correlation (Cameron and Miller, 2015) , I use cluster-robust standard errors whenever possible. As the more conservative option for nested data involves clustering on a higher level, I cluster on the 28 countries included rather than on the program level.
A Breusch-Pagan LM test confirms that considerable between-program heterogeneity exists in the data and that a random effects or fixed effects model is thus preferable to pooled OLS regression.
Hausman tests performed on various model specifications consistently reject one of the key assumptions underpinning the random effects model, i.e., that all independent variables are uncorrelated with the residuals. Therefore, I opt for the consistent-although less efficient-fixed effects model, which only makes use of within-program variation.
Model 1 in Table 2 Nickell (1981) , OLS estimates from models with both fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable tend to be biased due to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. Therefore, the main model, Model 5, applies a version of the bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVc) (Kiviet, 1995) , which has been found to be reasonably accurate when evaluated on unbalanced, short panels, such as those in the data used here (Flannery and Hankins, 2013 Although the positive and strongly significant interaction effects reported from all models in Table   2 Whereas the coefficients for all the independent variables reported in Table 2 . In contrast to this rather substantial effect, the bar on the right in the panel on the left
shows that the estimated effect of Left-wing government strength on Scope for programs that target 'non-core' groups is only 2 percent and far from being statistically significant. These results strongly corroborate hypothesis H 1 .
As shown in the panel on the right, a full shift to a left-wing government is estimated to have a considerable effect on programs that entail a broken unemployment spell. For an average program with this feature, the estimated effect is a 40-percent increase in Scope. For programs that do not break the unemployment spell, the effect is -8 percent, which is in the hypothesized direction but not large enough to be statistically significant. Taken together, these results lend fairly strong support to hypothesis H 2 .
In sum, the overall results provide evidence of substantial heterogeneous partisan effects on the governments' ALMP 'effort' in programs with varying characteristics, which is in line with the theoretical argument outlined above. An identical set of models applied to the logged annual program Expenditure, reported in Appendix II, Table 8 , produce coefficients that are only slightly smaller than those for Scope in Table 2 and that are all significant to the same extent. Additional models of Scope reported in Appendix II, Tables 9-12 suggest that the results are robust to a number of sample adjustments and to other measures of left-wing power. Moreover, as reported in Appendix II, Table, 13, with one interesting exception   15 , the estimates also are found to be in the same direction and of a similar or larger value when the sample is split into five country clusters:
Scandinavian, Continental, Anglo-Saxon, Southern, and Central and Eastern European. Although the coefficients in these models are not significant in most cases, they provide a preliminary indication that no particular welfare regime drives the results.
Concluding discussion
The argument advanced in this study differs from those in all three dominant strands of the large-N comparative ALMP literature reviewed above. Whereas the historically dominant 'power resources' account holds that ALMPs are primarily promoted by the left (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Janoski, 1990; Janoski, 1994; Rothstein, 1996; Boix, 1998; Huo et al., 2008) , the results presented here
show that, for programs that target groups outside the 'core' of the labor force-which accounted for up to 40 percent of the observations-right-wing governments are just as expansionary as leftwing governments.
In addition, the results are also at odds with the understanding of ALMP advanced in 'insider/outsider' perspective that Rueda (2005 Rueda ( , 2006 Rueda ( , 2007 introduced as a critique of the 'power resources' approach. At first glance, the positive interaction effect found between left-wing strength and ALMP 'effort' in programs that target people at the 'core' of the labor force seems to corroborate Rueda's (2005 Rueda's ( , 2006 Rueda's ( , 2007 'insider/outsider' hypothesis and the 'left party disinvestment thesis' introduced by Tepe and Vanhuysse (2013) . However, the size of the interaction effect reported in Figure 1 indicates that right-wing governments match-but do not exceed-left-wing governments' commitment to programs that also target 'non-core' groups. This study thus provides no evidence that left-wing governments cater less to the interests of 'outsiders' than right-wing governments.
My understanding of why the 'power resources' approach and the 'insider/outsider' approach ascribe different ALMP preferences to parties with different ideologies is that these approaches make different implicit assumptions about the overall objective of such policies. On the one hand, in the 'power resources' account, ALMPs aim to reduce and/or prevent open unemploymentwhereby they are expected to strengthen the position of organized labor; on the other hand, in the 'insider/outsider' account, ALMPs seek to bring outsiders into the labor market-whereby they are expected to challenge the status of the generally better-organized workers at the 'core' of the labor force. The present study reconciles these perspectives by stressing that ALMPs can serve either purpose.
In line with the 'power resources' account, left-wing governments are more inclined to expand two types of programs: those that seek to reduce or prevent unemployment among people at the 'core' of the labor force and those for which enrollment implies a temporary exit from open unemployment. In addition, in line with the 'insider/outsider' approach, left-wing parties do indeed cater to the interests of 'core' groups (by targeting them with ALMPs). However, this study finds that left-wing and right-wing governments are equally inclined to expand programs that also aim to increase the labor market participation of 'non-core' groups, which is at odds with the 'insider/outsider' approach. As increased labor supply is conducive to growth, the results are in line with Boix's (1998, p. 11) basic argument that all parties have a preference for growth-enhancing policies, although the results do not support his assertion that right-wing governments "reject any sort of public capital formation policies" (to which Boix counts human capital-enhancing ALMPs).
Insofar as these results indicate that right-wing governments in the present days are more inclined to channel public resources toward training, employment subsidies, and other human capitalenhancing policies for marginal groups as a means of increasing their labor supply (instead of relying on traditional tax-reducing strategies alone), they perhaps corroborate the third strand of the literature, which argues that policy convergence has occurred in recent decades (Lindvall, 2010; Bonoli, 2013; Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2013; Nelson, 2013) . However, the results clearly suggest that it is too soon to conclude, as some do, that partisan politics have lost their relevance in the 'postactivation turn' welfare state. Instead, the results illustrate how a traditional ideological conflict extends into the realm of ALMP programs and finds new expressions in their detailed policy settings. As such, comparative scholars need to move beyond measures of aggregate spending and more closely examine the ways in which a government that is elected to administer a modern welfare state can re-calibrate (rather than revoke) the large policy portfolios that it inherits to serve its own particular objectives.
Notably, the design of the present study-which, to achieve a reliable identification strategy, only exploits within-country variation-is limited because it produces effect estimates that are averaged across countries. As recent studies have reported cross-country variation in the effect of partisanship on ALMP (e.g., Vlandas, 2013) , a more comprehensive exploration of how the party preferences theorized in the present study might vary across institutional environments seems like a promising endeavor for future research. The EU's possible influence on the ALMP portfolios of its member Endnotes 1 For a more detailed review of most of these studies, see Tepe and Vanhuysse (2013) . 2 A description of the traditional categories of ALMP programs is provided in Appendix I, Furåker's (1976, p. 106 ) classification scheme, direct job creation, start-up incentives and early retirement measures serve to reduce unemployment but not labor shortages, whereas measures to increase the labor market participation of people who are not currently in the labor force and to expand labor immigration serve to reduce labor shortages but not unemployment. Moving grants and certain types of labor market training, as well as most placement services, serve to reduce both unemployment and labor shortages by improving matching. Some labor market policy measures, including unemployment benefits and general placement services for people who are already employed, serve none of the purposes. 5 One example is the Italian 'work-entry contract', Contratto di inserimento lavorativo, through which employers can provide apprenticeships to youth and certain categories of disadvantaged workers, such as the long-term unemployed, the disabled, and women who live in problem areas (European Commission, 2015) . 6 In some analyses (for instance Thelen, 2014, ch. 4) , STW schemes are explicitly distinguished from ALMP schemes, based precisely on their distinct target groups. This approach is unfortunate for two reasons: First, it relies on the unverified assumption that all other ALMPs target 'outsiders'. Second, it does not fit well with the way that these policies are reported and aggregated in the widely used labor-market policy databases, which also include programs that target the 'employed at risk of unemployment', such as STW programs (Grubb and Puymoyen, 2008; Eurostat, 2013) . 7 Thus, programs that target people who are not already participating in the labor force might even increase the unemployment rate, to the extent that people begin to supply their labor but fail to find employment. 8 Residual analyses presented in Appendix II, Figure 2 confirm that this operation is essential: the residuals from the regressions approximately follow a normal distribution only if it the dependent variable is log-transformed. 9 One example is the recruitment subsidy nystartsjobb, established in Sweden in 2007. Eligible participants include not only the registered unemployed but also anyone who has been absent from the labor market for a long time (typically for more than one year) or who is a newly arrived immigrant (European Commission, 2015). 10 The program-level fixed effects also mitigate the plausible concern that not all parties classified as left-wing parties across the 28 countries are necessarily positioned farther to the left on the left-right continuum than all right-wing parties. Because only within-country information is used in all models, only the relative position of left-wing and rightwing parties within each country is important for this indicator of left-wing strength to spare this study from such concerns.
11 To be precise, a few dozen programs are divided into two or more components because a single program might comprise expenditure and participant data that need to be divided between more than one program category. Here, each of these component is treated as a separate unit of observation. 12 The main effects of Core target group and Broken unemployment, unlike those of the four program categories, are not fully absorbed by the program-fixed effects because considerable within-program variation exists in these policy settings over time. 13 For the sake of parsimony, no model includes the interactions between the program category and Core target group or between the program category and Broken unemployment, as all eight are insignificant. 14 The exponentiated effect of coefficient β is calculated by taking the base of natural logarithm, e, to the power of β. As the estimated marginal effects of a change to a Left-wing government on Scope for a program with a Core target group is 0.360 in Model 5, the exponentiated effect is e 0.360 = 1.434. 15 In continental countries, Broken unemployment × Left-wing government strength is markedly smaller. Table 3 provides descriptions of the six traditional ALMP program categories and statistics on the share of observations in each category that has Core target group and Broken unemployment characteristics respectively. Table 4 presents summary statistics for all the baseline variables included in the models. Table 5 reports how the observations are distributed across countries and years. Table 6 illustrates the structure of the data set by presenting all the utilized program-year level data for two observations of two di↵erent programs-one in Sweden and one in Germany. Table 7 reports in more detail the partial conditional e↵ects of Left-wing government strength on Scope that are presented in Figure   1 . Covers measures that aim to improve the employability of participants 1,979 48 63 through training. The measures should include some evidence of classroom teaching or supervision, specifically for the purpose of instruction. Short courses that only develop a person's ability to get a job are considered labor market services and fall outside this category.
Appendix I: Supplementary Data
Employment incentives
Covers measures that facilitate the recruitment of unemployed persons and 1,888 72 84 other target groups or help ensure the continued employment of persons at risk of involuntary job loss. It refers to subsidies for open market jobs that might exist or be created without the public subsidy and that will hopefully be sustainable after the end of the subsidy period.
Sheltered and supported
Covers measures that aim to promote the labor market integration of persons 702 45 64 employment with reduced working capacity through sheltered or supported employment or and rehabilitation through rehabilitation.
Direct job creation
Covers measures that create additional jobs, usually of community benefit or 708 75 70 social use, to find employment for the long-term unemployed or persons otherwise di cult to place. It refers to subsidies for temporary, nonmarket jobs that would not exist or be created without public intervention.
Start-up incentives
Covers measures that promote entrepreneurship by encouraging the 375 61 91 unemployed and other target groups to start their own business or to become self-employed. Assistance may take the form of direct cash benefits or indirect support including loans, provision of facilities, and business advice.
Labor market services
Services refers to labor market interventions where the main activity of ---participants is job-search related and where participation usually does not result in a change of labor market status. Services also cover functions of the Public Employment Service that are not directly linked to participants, such as services for employers, administrative functions and general overheads. Source: Eurostat (2013 ), European Commission (2015 . The EU LMP database also includes the two other categories Out-of-work income maintenance and support and Early retirement. These LMP categories are usually refered to as 'support' schemes or 'passive' schemes. Count of  1999  2000  2001 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  Total  Programs  Austria  16  18  20  20  19  18  19  19  19  19  19  20  20  20  20  286  26  Belgium  23  27  31  28  31  30  31  33  46  50  56  57  54  54  53  604  72  Bulgaria  22  26  26  26  29  24  30  29  30  242  49  Cyprus  5  1 1  6  8  1 4  44  21  Czech Republic  6  7  8  10  10  11  11  9  9  9  9  99  13  Denmark  14  15  14  13  14  12  12  12  11  11  12  10  11  11  172  22  Estonia  2  1  2  4  4  4  6  7  9  9  48  9  Finland  17  17  17  18  18  18  17  15  18  17  17  17  17  17  17  257  19  France  26  27  26  28  28  29  30  32  28  32  31  31  27  26  401  61  Germany  18  19  19  23  27  28  35  38  40  43  40  43  39  32  35  479  73  Greece  4  8  5  1  20  37  5  11  91  59  Hungary  10  10  11  11  11Portugal  15  20  24  26  24  22  20  28  29  27  28  35  33  32  32  395  61  Romania  10  12  12  14  14  13  14  14  13  116  15  Slovakia  6  8  9  8  15  16  17  15  17  111  22  Slovenia  13  16  11  16  18  22  18  19  133  45  Spain  9  9  16  14  14  14  10  10  13  13  14  14  14  14  178  24  Sweden  21  23  21  22  19  19  19  18  23  25  24  25  26  25  27  337  51  United Kingdom  1  5  5  5  6  6  6  5  6  5  6  2  58  9  Total  227  261  282  283  298  333  357  416  465  492  468  487  487  459  337 5652 888 E↵ects of a change from 0 to 100 % left-wing cabinet seats, with all other variables at their means.
Estimations produced from Model 5. Tables 8-13 below report a set of alternative model specifications that -unless otherwise noted -are versions of Model 4, Table 2 (chosen for this exercise over Model 5 due to its slightly more conservative standard errors). Brief comments are provided here:
Appendix II: Robustness Checks and Extensions
1. Models E1-E5, Table 8 , are identical to those in Table 2 2. In model A1, Table 9 , the sample is extended also to labor market programs that are not typically classified as ALMP measures: labor market services, out-of-work income maintenance and support, and early retirement. The coe cients of interest are slightly reduced but still significant to the same extent.
3. Model A2 excludes all programs that have an average cost per participant-year that is less than the median cost per participant-year among all observations in the country. This is to address the possible validity concern that low-cost programs might not be of much value to the participants, and that therefore they should not be considered beneficial to its target group. The coe cients of interest are slightly changed and precision is somewhat reduced, but overall the pattern holds.
4. In model A3 the observation for the year following the year in which the program was started is dropped for those programs that were established during the observed period (the start year for these program was already dropped due to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable) to control for systematically lower Scope due simply to the fact that the program is new). All results are intact. 6. In model A5, Table 10 , the measurement of left-wing government strength used above is substituted for a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the government is dominated by left-wing parties (at least 66.6 left-wing cabinet seats) (Armingeon et al. 2015) . Coe cients are slightly reduced but the results hold.
7. in model A6, Table 11 , the measurement of Left-wing government strength used above is substituted for an indicator on the parliamentary seat share of social democratic and other left parties in government, weighted by the number of days in o ce Table 12 , Left-wing government strength is replaced by an analogous indicator of right-wing strength (Armingeon et al. 2015) . Whereas the coe cient for the Broken unemployment ⇥ Right-wing government interaction is una↵ected, Core target group ⇥ Right-wing government drops below significance. One interpretation of this finding is that center parties tend to behave more like right-wing parties with respect to Core target group than with respect to Broken unemployment.
9. Models A8-A12, Table 13 , split the sample into five country clusters to assess whether any particular welfare regime drives the results. Precision is reduced in most models, but with few exceptions -notably that Broken unemployment ⇥ Leftwing government strength is smaller for the Continental countries -the estimates are in the same direction and of a similar or larger size.
10. In Table 14 , lastly, I opt for an approach similar to that of most studies in the field, by providing four models where the total expenditure for programs with varying characteristics is aggregated to the country-year level and expressed as % of (one ppm of) GDP. For the sake of familiarity, I follow Vlandas (2013) by applying OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors and Prais-Winston transformation.
Though precision is low due to the low N of 324, there is clear indication of left-wing e↵ects in line with the hypotheses. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the country level). ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01 Note that the Direct job creation ⇥ Left-wing dummy is the reference category. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the country level). ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01 Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the country level) ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01 Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the country level) ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01 
